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 Several recent books have addressed “How Doctors 
Think,” with emphasis on diagnostic decision making 
and the sources of diagnostic error.  National venues 
now target the problem of diagnostic error and new 
studies highlight the high levels of costly and unnec-
essary test ordering, much of which is related to inef-
fective diagnostic processes.  And, finally, teaching 
clinical reasoning is still considered a difficult curricu-
lum to master.  Why do physicians have difficulty in 
making a diagnosis?  
Is making a diagnosis unique to medical decision making? 
Given the fact that every day we use “diagnostic decision making” to solve problems 
at work, at home or at play, why is clinical reasoning and diagnostic decision making 
in the clinical setting so difficult to learn and master?  And why is diagnostic decision 
making any different than the reasoning we use to solve problems in our daily lives?  
Doesn’t finding your car keys require diagnostic decision making?  Clearly, any adult 
is faced with problems that require solutions on a daily basis and is it not reasonable 
to use the term “diagnostic decision making” to explain these processes?  Is there 
something uniquely different or difficult when we solve problems in the practice of 
medicine?  Are physicians any different from auto mechanics who use reasoning and 
diagnostic tools to identify problems under the hood?  I don’t think so. 
In summary, as human beings, we have the capacity to reason and have been con-
stantly solving problems since childhood; clearly, some of us are better diagnosticians 
than others.  However, there is absolutely no rationale that the modus operandi for 
clinical reasoning and decision making in medicine is unique or different from that 
used in daily life. 
So what is the nature of the problem? 
I believe there are three fundamental steps in effective decision making that, if unmet, 
result in an ineffective diagnostic process and potential diagnostic error.  First is com-
mand of knowledge about the subject; if you don’t know what something  (continued)  
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(cont) looks like, you are not going to recognize it.  In clinical diagnosis, knowledge of the clinical and epidemi-
ologic characteristics that define a condition or diagnosis and knowledge about the patient that address these 
characteristics are fundamental.  Second is the practice of hypothetical deductive probability-based reasoning 
that focuses on ruling-in a single, most likely diagnosis.  And third, is awareness and consideration of the obsta-
cles or distractions that bias reasoning and contribute to cognitive errors in the diagnostic process. 
Regarding the first, clinicians are more likely to diagnose a condition that they have studied or seen; this is why 
specialists are able to diagnose unusual or rare disorders that generalists might miss.  Successful diagnostic deci-
sion making requires knowledge of clinical and epidemiologic characteristics of each of the possible candidate 
conditions and consideration of these characteristics in evaluating the patient’s risks and clinical presentation.  
Do you know what the condition that you are seeking looks like?  Have you systematically considered all neces-
sary related pertinent positive and negative clinical and historical findings that relate to the single best diagnosis.  
My experience today is that many clinicians do not know and systemically consider the characteristics that define 
each and every specific diagnosis under consideration. 
Second, efforts must be directed to the process of deductive reasoning and ruling-in the single best diagnosis.  
Too much effort seems to be spent ruling-out unlikely and less probable conditions rather than basing the proc-
ess on the increasing weight of evidence.  While consideration of possible serious and life-threatening albeit rare 
conditions is warranted, identification of the key characteristics of the single best, most likely, diagnosis should 
rule-out unlikely conditions  early in the workup.  The key here is increasing certainty (confidence) in a single, 
most likely diagnosis.  Even late in the diagnostic process, clinicians can relate unlikely conditions (the rule-out 
mentality) but still specify three or four conditions under consideration; they have not yet focused on acquiring 
the information that will yield a single best diagnosis.  In this regard, epidemiologic characteristics, if not un-
known, are often not considered by many clinicians.  Yet, assessing risk characteristics greatly increases the pre-
cision of probability estimates.  
The third issue arises from the many distractions that disrupt the reasoning process.  Kassier and Koppleman 
offer a good description of the errors that occur in cognition; most are manifested by biases in clinical reasoning.  
For example, we tend to consider diagnoses that we recently missed or encountered, no matter how unlikely 
they may be.  Rather, focusing on gathering data to rule-in the single, most likely diagnosis is the key to success-
ful and effective decision making. 
There are several other considerations that deserve attention.  A diagnosis consists of a pathological or functional 
process, e.g. metabolic, infectious, neoplastic, and an involved organ or system, e.g. lung, vascular system, etc.  I 
am often struck by the number of discharge diagnoses that do not indicate the nature of the problem; non-
specific chest pain or unspecified abdominal pain are not diagnoses but symptoms that require the application of 
a diagnostic pathway to identify a specific process and organ system.  Failure to identify the cause of non-specific 
chest pain is a major reason that myocardial ischemia is a leading cause of malpractice litigation.  Another con-
sideration is our variable capacity to deal with the uncertainties of diagnostic decision making.  The key to deal-
ing with such discomfort is to embrace the above practices in order maximize the likelihood that you will focus 
on the single best diagnosis.  As hospitalists, we often know little about our patients prior to admission and must 
recognize our limitations.  In an attempt to garner the information that is necessary to rule-in a diagnosis, we of-
ten rely on modern references which, unlike textbooks, provide only cursory descriptions of  clinical characteris-
tics associated with specific disorders;  taking the time to review the detailed information in textbooks will im-
prove our diagnostic skills.  It is also important to know the prevalence of diseases in the population that you 
serve; combined with data from your history, physical and lab testing, this should help to direct you toward the 
most likely, best-fit diagnosis. 
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